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ARTICLE
2-207 and Company (For Richard A. Hausler)
PATRICK 0. GUDRIDGE*
Richard Hausler possessed-or was possessed by-a distinctive
intelligence. He was often characterized as theatrical (the recessional at
his funeral was "There's No Business Like Show Business"). But this
label is too straightforward. Hausler's mind worked with extraordinary
facility within conventions, within overtly artificial points of view. His
thought pushed quickly and elaborately to the limit of his chosen conceit
or stance, and demanded that those who would engage him proceed like-
wise. Hausler knew as well-seemed to grasp immediately in any par-
ticular setting-the power that conventions confer on transitions.
Moving outside until-then confining formulas imparts a force, an
urgency, a sense of the real and the authentic, to what is said next. Rich-
ard Hausler was able-remarkably often-to conjoin the theatrical and
the moral (a distinctive accomplishment).
I will try to write for Richard Hausler. My subject (his, not ordina-
rily mine) will be contracts and the Uniform Commercial Code. My
point of departure will be an essay by Richard Hyland, at one time also a
member of the University of Miami faculty. (Familiar Miami figures
stir in the background-Soia Mentschikoff and Daniel Murray.) In par-
ticular, I will discuss section 2-207 and associated sections of the pro-
posed revisions of Articles 1 and 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. It
is not clear, at this point, that revised Articles 1 and 2 will clear all the
necessary hurdles. The provisions that I read are not much in contro-
versy-or so I understand. They are, however, jurisprudentially provoc-
ative-or so I will argue.
A.
Richard Hyland's essay Draft, published in 1997,1 intersperses two
accounts. The first and longer is a discussion of some problems occa-
* Professor, University of Miami School of Law. Thanks to Michael Fischl for guidance,
Terry Anderson and Bob Hillman for helpfully incisive readings, and participants in a Law School
faculty seminar (especially for their instructive appreciation of the work of Richard Hyland).
Errors and oddities, of course, are mine.
1. Richard Hyland, Draft, 97 COL. L. REV. 1343 (1997).
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sioned by section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code-the famous
"Battle of the Forms" provision-that Hyland believed were not satis-
factorily resolved by then-current draft language proposed as part of the
on-going reformulation of Article 2.2 The second-presented in frag-
ments breaking up the U.C.C. exploration-describes the setting within
which Hyland was writing and the events unfolding while he was writ-
ing. "I am sitting cross-legged on a plastic picnic mat in one of the wide
expanses of soft, close-cropped grass dispersed throughout Shinjuku
Park."
3
There might be several reasons why Professor Hyland wrote his
essay in this way. The personal interludes offer readers an opportunity
to break free momentarily from a highly concentrated argument and
refresh their attention. The suggestion that the essay was written all at
once, in one sitting, indeed out of doors in Tokyo, also works to reduce
the reader's demand for supporting materials. Hyland included no foot-
notes, no quotations in full of either section 2-207 or its would-be
replacement, no discussions of cases. We are presented with only
Hyland's argument, stated only in his own terms (it is only this, presum-
ably, that Hyland wanted us to consider). Here, however, I want to
explore another hypothesis. I propose that we read Richard Hyland as
inserting a kind of allegory into his essay, an oblique commentary or
specification of expectations. Hyland's naturalism may be entirely false.
He may not have written the essay all at once, and the setting within
which he actually wrote may have been much less pastoral. Its personal
interludes might be fictions for all we know. But fictions, we also know,
are often useful.
This is the narrative that Professor Hyland provides us once we put
it all together.
TW sits in a Tokyo park. While writing, he watches his very
young daughter play with two older children-strangers. His wife
has gone to get food. She returns. TW stops writing. His wife feeds
the child small rice balls encased in fried tofu. TW waits to eat until
the child is finished (out of deference to his wife's concern about the
child's eating habits). The child's diaper needs changing. Although
this is ordinarily TW's responsibility, his wife takes charge of the task
and TW resumes writing. The sun begins to set and TW's wife
prepares to leave the park. She packs up their belongings (this is
also ordinarily TW's responsibility). TW continues to write. The sun
sets and the park officially closes. A park police officer allows TW to
2. This revision is a joint effort by the American Law Institute and the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
3. Hyland, supra note 1.
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finish writing before leaving the park.4
An idyll of opportunism, of advantage-taking and consensus: TW
is almost always able to do what he wants-write-because others
adjust their conduct to complement his aims. Sometimes this just hap-
pens. The two children play with his daughter. But more often, it
seems, others recognize that there is no reason not to accommodate TW.
The police officer waits. TW's wife is prepared, in these circumstances
at least, to change the diaper and pack up. TW reciprocates. He recog-
nizes that it is important for his wife that their daughter eat first, even
though he himself thinks it doesn't matter so much, and thus he waits to
eat. There is no real conflict in Hyland's narrative. Individuals are able
to do what they want to do because other individuals have no reason not
to defer.
So?5
The conclusion that Professor Hyland draws from his discussion of
section 2-207 and its proposed revision is that both the extant statutory
formula and its would-be successor make matters worse in cases in
which parties to a contract have not themselves unequivocally agreed in
advance to terms relevant to a dispute. Either formula, he contends, will
prescribe arbitrary results or define a moral hazard: invite strategic pos-
turing by one or another party.6 Hyland would abandon the effort.
"[W]hy isn't the rule simply that the facts and circumstances of the case
will determine whether the varying terms become part of the agree-
ment[?]"' "[T]he determination of the terms of the contract" should be
4. See id. at 1343-44, 1353-54, 1356, 1357-58, 1361-62. This is my summary-I condense
Richard Hyland's own passages. Hyland writes in the first person. But because I treat what he is
writing as a short story rather than an autobiographical fragment, I will refer to the essay's "I" as
"TW" (the writer).
5. I do not mean by this question to suggest that the idea of opportunistic consensus-
insofar as it is suggested by Richard Hyland's narrative-is uninteresting in general. The
proposition that legal norms are put to use, in some circumstances, precisely for the purpose of
negotiating changes in the norms, obviously has affinities with the familiar notion of "bargaining
in the shadow of the law" and also with the equally familiar notion of bodies of law functioning as
default rules. If the idea of opportunistic consensus adds anything, it is first an emphasis on
improvisation-the adjustment occurs in real time, as it were, as the individuals involved grasp
the situation, the implications of the legal norm, the alternatives, and their own stakes. Second,
there is also the distinctive pattern of interested assertion and disinterested acquiescence. The
immediacy of this exercise in micro-government, I think, and its conjunction of activity and
passivity ultimately limit its relevance with regard to the sorts of arrangements addressed by
Article 2. Self-government, a very different notion (I will argue), fits better here.
6. There are many discussions of present section 2-207 that criticize the provision. See, e.g.,
JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 47-48 (5 th ed. 2000)
[hereinafter WHrrE & SUMMERS]; Daniel Keating, Exploring the Battle of the Forms in Action, 98
MICH. L. REV. 2678 (2000) (referencing literature).
7. Hyland, supra note 1, at 1351.
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"left entirely to the courts."8 What, then, will the courts do? This ques-
tion does not interest Hyland. "There is simply no way to constrain a
judge to decide a dispute in a way the judge believes to be improper."9
Judges will not act "against fairness" or "reach the wrong result" but
will instead opt for a "good reason" suggested by what the judge
believes to be the circumstances of the case. °
This conclusion is quite strong. Richard Hyland cannot be recom-
mending that common law formulations replace statutory language. The
problems that he identifies would then simply re-present themselves to
judges as they try to word their opinions or summarize previous deci-
sions. Hyland must want judges to try to decide and try to describe only
what is in front of them-we should end up with an accumulation of
individual cases and no generalizations. The question of the content of
contract terms would be a matter for adjudication, and for legal process,
but would not be an occasion for articulating substantive principles.
Judges would, presumably, function something like arbiters, or jurors in
negligence cases.
Of course, however admirably austere, this proposal is not espe-
cially useful for the judges who must decide the cases or the lawyers
who argue them. But maybe this is the point at which Professor
Hyland's writerly narrative becomes pertinent. One version of a fair
result, we might think, is suggested by the idea of opportunistic consen-
sus implicit in Hyland's account of his picnic in the park-if a particular
outcome matters much for one party, and its opposite matters not at all
or only a little for the other party, the right result is the one sought by the
party with the greater concern. This proposition, perhaps, is enough to
guide lawyers and judges in working through specific cases; it also
should not, we may think, require much in the way of potentially troub-
lesome elaboration (as opposed to application).
Or is this too easy?
B.
What we think about this question may matter. The revisers of
Article 2, by summer 2000, seemingly pretty much agreed with Richard
Hyland.l" This was the draft prepared then for the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (it remains the proposed
8. Id. at 1359.
9. Id. at 1361.
10. Id. at 1361, 1358.
11. See Dennis Patterson, The Limits of Empiricism: What Facts Tell Us, 98 MICH. L. REV.




SECTION 2-207. TERMS OF CONTRACT; EFFECT OF CONFIRMATION.
If (i) conduct by both parties recognizes the existence of a con-
tract although their records do not otherwise establish a contract, (ii)
a contract is formed by an offer and acceptance, or (iii) a contract
formed in any manner is confirmed by a record that contains terms
additional to or different from those in the contract being confirmed,
the terms of the contract, subject to Section 2-202, are:
(a) terms that appear in the records of both parties;
(b) terms, whether in a record or not, to which both parties
agree; and
(c) terms supplied or incorporated under any provision of [the
Uniform Commercial Code].
The "Preliminary Comments" of the revisers state:
By inviting a court to determine whether a party 'agrees' to the other
party's terms, the text recognizes the enormous variety of circum-
stances that may be presented to a court under this section, and the
section gives the court greater discretion to include or exclude certain
terms than original Section 2-207 did.' 3
Should attempted reconstruction of "opportunistic consensus"
inform judicial exercise of "greater discretion"? We need to consider
somewhat more closely Professor Hyland's short story. Hyland's writer
and the persons with whom the writer interacts never disagree. They
recognize immediately when their own interests are implicated (or not),
and they also recognize just as quickly when the interests of the others
are implicated. No one, therefore, changes her or his mind. At first
glance, of course, matters in litigation do not fit this picture. The inter-
ests of all parties appear to be at stake and in a state of opposition. Their
accounts of what they thought was their agreement differ, not surpris-
ingly, in ways consistent with their opposing interests. A judge could
not expect to find the prerequisites of a single, complementary pattern of
assertion and deference in the descriptions by the parties of their under-
12. U.C.C. § 2-207 (2000 Annual Meeting Draft) available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/
ulc/ucc2/21100.htm (Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 - Sales (Draft for Discussion Only)
prepared for July 28 - Aug. 4, 2000 NCCUSL annual meeting); U.C.C. § 2-207 (2001 Annual
Meeting Draft) available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucc2/ART0612.htm (prepared for
the Aug. 10-17, 2001 NCCUSL annual meeting).
13. U.C.C. § 2-207 preliminary cmt. 3. "There is a limitless variety of verbal and nonverbal
behavior that may be claimed to be an agreement to another's record. The section leaves the
interpretation of that behavior to the wise discretion of the courts." Id.
Present section 2-207(3) clearly served as one starting point for the proposal, prefiguring
proposed section 2-207 subsections (1) and (3). See page 375 infra. The beginnings of subsection
(2) are apparent in the somewhat more complex language of "Alternative B" put forward by a
U.C.C. drafting committee in October, 1993. See Thomas J. McCarthy, An Introduction: The
Commercial Irrelevancy of the "Battle of the Forms," 49 Bus. LAW. 1019, 1020-21 (1994).
20011
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
taking as they understand it as of the time they appear in court. The
judge might be able, however, to suppose that at some earlier time the
parties did not understand their interests in such zero-sum terms, and
that the terms of their agreement might be properly described as expres-
sing this earlier understanding. The familiar distinction between ex post
and ex ante perspectives would once more be put to work.
But the idea that there was some moment before dispute in which
the parties agreed on what mattered or did not matter to each other
seems fanciful. The terms at issue, after all, are not "terms that appear
in the records of both parties." This must mean that, at the time the
parties established their relationship, the terms were not of such immedi-
ate concern to either party that either party wanted the relevance of the
terms to be fixed unequivocally.' 4 Suppose, for example, that the even-
tual subject of dispute initially appeared to the parties to be a low
probability contingency, thus not worth the cost of negotiating. One or
the other party might have floated its "ideal" terms, perhaps with an eye
to later negotiation or litigation-but there would be no reason to con-
clude, given the perceived low probabilities, that any such floated terms
represented what that party had to have. A judge cannot assume, there-
fore, that the parties possessed, at some point prior to dispute, fully spec-
ified conceptions of materiality. The most that the judge can try to do is
extrapolate from those terms upon which the parties plainly did agree,
and perhaps from those terms which the parties plainly left for U.C.C.
default resolution, in order to hypothesize additional party interests and
terms-terms to which the parties would be deemed to have agreed,
terms therefore arguably falling within subsection 2-207(b).
It is not especially likely, therefore, that floated terms will be
enforced as is on the assumption that I attribute to Richard Hyland-that
added terms are effective only if they matter to one but not the other
party (or parties). Would-be additions framed to favor strongly one
party, we may think, will not very often appear to be of little rele-
vance-immaterial-to the interests of another party. 5 The judge
might try to formulate variant terms of lesser advantage to one party,
and thus arguably irrelevant to another, or instead declare the absence of
party-agreed terms and apply U.C.C. default provisions. The first option
puts the judge squarely in the middle of the dispute, unambiguously the
14. It must also be the case that at least one of the parties is not, at the time of dispute and
litigation, satisfied with default terms "supplied or incorporated" by the U.C.C. itself. I assume,
for the moment, that trade usage, course of dealing, or similar sources of contract terms are not
relevant.
15. Most provisions offering clear-cut gains to one party can be reworded to reduce the gain;
another party might bargain for some advantage for itself in a negotiated arrangement, therefore,
in return for allowing the unequivocal advantage.
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writer of the ultimately decisive terms. The second alternative is radi-
cally different: if unilaterally-offered party terms will often be too one-
sided from the perspective of the other party, the role of the judge will
become simply that of announcer-declaring U.C.C. default terms to be
applicable. Subsections (a) and (c) of proposed section 2-207 will mat-
ter much more in practice than subsection (b).
Which is the better approach? A straightforwardly substantive
inquiry-"interpretation" of the "limitless variety of verbal and nonver-
bal behavior that may be claimed to be an agreement," 16 case-specific
and therefore seemingly right business for judges-abruptly morphs into
the too-familiar, always-vertiginous question of judicial role, judges
contemplating their own image, judging themselves as much or more
than the case at hand. We should want to resist this institutional transla-
tion. But what then are we-and the judge-to think about the discre-
tion that proposed section 2-207 may confer and that Professor Hyland
would plainly applaud?
C.
It is time to read statutory language more closely.
At the outset, we need to recall the wording of the present (long-
time) section 2-207:
ADDITIONAL TERMS IN ACCEPTANCE OR CONFIRMATION
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written
confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an
acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from
those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made
conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition
to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the
contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the
offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is
given within a reasonable time after notice of them is
received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a con-
tract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings
of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the
terms of the particular contract consist of those terms on which the
writings of the parties agree, together with any supplementary terms
16. U.C.C. § 2-207 preliminary cmt. 3 (Annual Meeting Draft May 2001).
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incorporated under any other provisions of this Act. 7
Two concerns are evident. The first is to identify the terms of the
contract. This is relatively easy if "the writings of the parties do not...
establish a contract" but do reveal contract terms. In this case, so long
as the conduct of the parties independently "recognizes the existence of
a contract," the terms are, according to subsection (3), the terms "on
which the writings of the parties agree," and otherwise "any supplemen-
tary terms" supplied by the U.C.C. itself. But within present section 2-
207, there is also a second preoccupation. Subsections (1) and (3),
famously, repudiate the common law "mirror image" rule. This does not
mean, however, that the idea behind the rule-party intent, in particular,
common intent of the parties-also disappears. The prominence of the
"conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract"
phrase in subsection (3) (it's the precondition for all that follows) is
revealing: the key is the state of mind ("recognizes") of the parties-
here circumstantially established. In subsections (1) and (2) this preoc-
cupation is even more apparent. "A definite and seasonable expression
of acceptance or written confirmation" is sufficient in subsection (1)
"unless acceptance is expressly made conditional . . . ." In subsections
(2)(a) and (c) the statutory inquiries into whether "the offer expressly
limits acceptance" or "notification of objection ...has already been
given" are once more obvious state of mind tests-what one or the other
party might be expected to recognize. Materiality, the central test in
subsection (2)(b), is also a proxy-another form of circumstantial con-
clusion. The more emphatic disposition of dealings "between
merchants" incorporated in the threshold of subsection (2) fits as well-
merchants should know to take each other's responses seriously and
should understand what is at stake for each other.
State of mind, however, plays a plainly diminished part in new sec-
tion 2-207. Conduct, offer and acceptance, and contract formation "in
any manner" are all the same; the focus now is-mostly-the "terms...
in the records of the parties."'18 This shift in emphasis is in part a conse-
quence of moving subsection (1) of present section 2-207 to proposed
section 2-206 (as new subsection (3)): "A definite and seasonable
expression of acceptance in a record operates as an acceptance even if it
contains terms additional to or different from the offer.' 9 Section 2-
206(3) is not itself decisive of anything (it just states a possibility).
"[A]ny responsive record must still be fairly regarded as an 'acceptance'
and not as a proposal for such a different transaction that it should be
17. U.C.C. § 2-207 (2001).
18. U.C.C. § 2-207(a) (Annual Meeting Draft 2001).
19. Id. § 2-206.
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construed to be a rejection of the offer."'20 The crucial provision is really
section 2-204(3)-its well-known language unchanged: "Even though
one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail for
indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is
a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.' State of
mind is, of course, the organizing preoccupation of section 2-204: "A
contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show
agreement .... It is certainly possible to label the proposed reloca-
tion of present section 2-207(1) as simply clarification-statutory house-
keeping. But it is also jurisprudential work. The question of whether
"the parties have intended to make a contract" is a different question-
section 2-204 supposes-from whether "there is a reasonably certain
basis for giving an appropriate remedy." "[A]greement" must mean,
therefore, something like mutual intent of the parties to assume legal
obligations to each other-but plainly enough it does not mean agree-
ment as to the content of the obligation.23 "Reasonably certain basis"
and "appropriate remedy" are matters left for other Article 2 provi-
sions-proposed section 2-207 importantly among them.
Within present section 2-207, in contrast, the question of the exis-
tence of the obligation and the specification of its content are distinct but
not entirely different issues. Specification is understood, in subsection
(2) at least, as a process of positing agreement to terms (acknowledge-
ment of obligation) in the absence of agreement of terms (acknowledge-
ment of the content of arrangements). Why might present section 2-207
proceed in this way? Statutory provisions define responsibilities-both
fix obligations and specify their terms-all the time. But statutes-it's
just as plain-need not be so definitive. Proposed section 2-204, we
have just seen, ties obligation to the state of mind of parties to a contract
(to their mutual agreement to be mutually obliged) even as it separates
out the question of content. Does this mean that the parties must be
understood to create the obligation? Not exactly: The U.C.C.-like any
statute-itself creates the legal obligation. The agreement of the parties,
however, is the statutory precondition triggering the statutory obliga-
tion, the specification of the statute's domain, the description of what it
addresses, its subject-matter. The U.C.C. concerns itself with party
20. Id. § 2-206 preliminary cmt. 2.
21. Id. § 2-204(3). Proposed section 2-204 now expressly includes offer and acceptance
within its domain. See id. § 2-204(1).
22. Id. § 2-204(1).
23. Proposed U.C.C. § 1-201 defines "agreement" as "the bargain of the parties in fact ... "
and defines "contract" as "the total legal obligation that results from the parties' agreement as
determined by [the Uniform Commercial Code] .... " U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(3) & (11) (2001 Annual
Meeting Draft) available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bil/ulc/ucc2/ucc l614O l.htm.
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understandings of contract terms, from this perspective, because the stat-
ute itself attributes value to the parties' sense of the situation. The sub-
stantive worth of party understandings is indeed, famously, an Article 2
article of faith. 24 "Merchants" dealing with other "merchants" act on
expectations expressing the "knowledge or skill"-the peculiar logic
and experience-of their trades." Respect for merchant knowledge also
readily explains the "second best" efforts of present section 2-207(2)(b)
to draw conclusions from even fragmentary manifestations of party
expectations.
But we can just as readily note the statutory impact of some so for
unstated second assumption. Present section 2-207(3) identifies as statu-
torily enforced whatever terms that parties jointly propose even if deal-
ings are not between merchants. The reason why agreement in the sense
of matching terms (and nothing more) matters cannot be-whatever it
does turn out to be-respect for merchant understandings and courses of
dealing. Proposed section 2-207(a) starts from present section 2-207(3).
The new statutory language, moreover, drops any reference to, and thus
special treatment for, transactions "between merchants." Is this a sharp
break with longstanding U.C.C. jurisprudence? Merchant understand-
ings might come in through the back door, of course, by way of pro-
posed subsection (b), which enforces "terms, whether in a record or not,
to which both parties agree.'"26 A Preliminary Comment observes
(ambiguously at once permissive and careful): "An 'agreement' may
include terms derived from a course of performance, a course of dealing,
and usage of trade. 217 There is also a new cross-reference (unexplained
in the Preliminary Comment), preceding and thus conditioning the appli-
cation of all three subsections-"subject to Section 2-202 . . . ." This
provision, addressing parol evidence, acknowledges (rather complicat-
edly, we will shortly see) the relevance of course of performance, course
of dealing and usage of trade. The obliqueness of these 2-207 endorse-
ments is telling, however. It is only within the context of other con-
cerns, whatever they are, and therefore "subject to" the play of these
concerns, that courses and usages "may" figure. It is necessary, I think,
to move past the usual rhetoric of commercial realism to try to determine
what else is at stake.
24. For a dramatic discussion, see Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REv. 621 (1975).
25. See UCC §§ 2-104(1) & (3) (2001 Annual Meeting Draft).
26. On this reading, interestingly, the organization of proposed section 2-207 approximates
that of the chapter discussing "Terms of the Contract" in WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 6:
"Terms Supplied by Express Agreement of the Parties"; "Terms Supplied by Course of Dealing,
Usage of Trade, and Course of Performance"; "Terms Supplied by Gap Filler Provisions of
Article 2 and General Law..." Id. at xxxii.




Proposed section 2-202 is an only slightly changed version of the
current U.C.C. parol evidence rule.
FINAL EXPRESSION IN A RECORD: PAROL OR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE.
(1) Terms with respect to which the confirmatory records of the par-
ties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a record intended by the
parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such
terms as are included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of
any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may
be supplemented by evidence of:
(a) course of performance, course of dealing or usage of trade
(Section 1-303); and
(b) consistent additional terms unless the court finds the record
to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive
statement of the terms of the agreement.
(2) Terms in a record may be explained by evidence of course of
performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade without a prelimi-
nary determination by the court that the language used is
ambiguous.28
Proposed section 2-202 works in part to identify and privilege
matching party-proposed terms-terms that then become subjects of
other Article 2 provisions like proposed section 2-207. It is easy to see
why proposed section 2-207 itself need not take up directly dealings
"between merchants." Merchant understandings figure in the workings
of proposed section 2-202 as subsection (1)(a) "usage of trade" to be
taken into account either to explain "[t]erms in a record" with respect to
which it is already clear that the parties are in agreement or to supple-
ment such terms.2 9 Supplementary usages of trade are tantamount to
matching terms according to a Comment accompanying proposed sec-
tion 1-303, the provision cross-referenced in subsection 202(1)(a):
[T]he meaning of the agreement of the parties is to be determined by
the language used by them and by their action, read and interpreted in
the light of commercial practices and other surrounding circum-
stances. The measure and background for interpretation are set by
28. See id. § 2-202 (showing the text of the proposed rule and also the changes). The
discussion that follows develops a reading of proposed section 2-202 treating it as one element of
a statutory scheme-as a parol evidence rule peculiar to Article 2. Obviously, it is also possible to
interpret section 2-202 as an amalgam of thinking about parol evidence rules that originates
independently of distinctive U.C.C. concerns. I do not develop this alternative approach here. For
an excellent discussion of the leading themes in twentieth century American thinking about parol
evidence, see Lawrence A. Cunningham, Toward a Prudential and Credibility-Centered Parol
Evidence Rule, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 269 (2000).
29. On the overlap of trade usage and merchant understanding, see U.C.C. § 1-303(c) &
preliminary cmt. 4 (2001 Annual Meeting Draft).
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the commercial context, which may explain and supplement even the
language of a formal or final writing.3°
This account, however, is too straightforward. Proposed section 2-
202 purports to address three situations: cases involving challenges to
"[t]erms with respect to which the confirmatory records of the parties
agree;" cases involving challenges to terms "otherwise set forth in a
record intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement
with respect to such terms;" and cases concerning the preemptive effect
of a record found "to have been intended also as a complete and exclu-
sive statement of the terms of the agreement."'3' The records at issue in
all three cases oust "any prior agreement or . . .contemporaneous oral
agreement." In the first and second sorts of cases, record terms "may be
supplemented by evidence of ... consistent additional terms," presuma-
bly originating in some prior or contemporaneous agreement of the par-
ties, presumably without regard to whether the added terms reflect
"course of performance, course of dealing or usage of trade." In the
third sort of case, such added terms are out of bounds. What about
courses and usages as such? Proposed section 2-202 standing alone
appears to declare these supplements to be pertinent in both the first and
second cases without concern for consistency and similarly seems to
apply the restriction in the third case only to added terms other than
courses and usages.
The cross-reference to proposed section 1-303, however, is
important:
COURSE OF PERFORMANCE, COURSE OF DEALING, AND USAGE OF
TRADE
(d) A course of performance or course of dealing between the parties
or usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which they are engaged
or of which they are or should be aware is relevant in ascertaining the
meaning of the parties' agreement, may give particular meaning to
specific terms of the agreement, and may supplement or qualify the
terms of the agreement ...
(e) ... the express terms of an agreement and any applicable course
of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade must be con-
strued whenever reasonable as consistent with each other. If such a
construction is unreasonable:
(1) express terms prevail over course of performance, course of deal-
ing, and usage of trade;
30. Id. § 1-303 preliminary cmt. 1. Proposed section 2-207(b), it appears, is complementary,
making usages of trade available in any cases that fall entirely outside section 2-202 because terms
in records are altogether absent although the conduct of the parties nonetheless triggers
obligations.
31. U.C.C. § 2-202(1) (2001 Annual Meeting Draft).
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(2) course of performance prevails over course of dealing and usage
of trade; and
(3) course of dealing prevails over usage of trade.32
Subsection (e) imposes a consistency requirement. Subsection (d) sug-
gests that the requirement is met by courses and usages that "supple-
ment" or "qualify" record terms.
In a classic battle of the forms, section 2-202's restrictions are not
especially salient apart from the protection afforded to matching terms in
party records-there is no one document with a plausible claim to defin-
itiveness (indeed, each party's form may proclaim itself to be the exclu-
sive record). From the perspective of proposed section 2-207, section 2-
202 may have more significance insofar as it restricts the set of relevant
party-supplied terms in cases in which one (and only one) record lays
claim to be the "final expression" of party understandings.33 Only "con-
sistent," "supplement[al]" additional terms or usages are pertinent-and
even these become irrelevant if the "final" record was meant to be a
"complete and exclusive statement."34 If there is a "final" record, there-
fore, added terms disclosed in other party records must be "consistent"
or "supplemental"-and thus will not suggest disagreement, thus neither
displacing nor excluding opposing terms in a "final" record under sec-
tion 2-207. But if added terms originate in the records of one party only,
is consistency or supplementarity for section 2-202 purposes alone suffi-
cient to establish that there are "terms, whether in a record or not, to
which both parties agree" in the sense of 2-207(b)? "[C]ourse of per-
formance, course of dealing or usages of trade" are deemed to be agreed
upon by the parties by proposed section 1-303, to be part of the under-
standing of the parties if consistent with express terms in party records.
Perhaps this statutory presumption is enough for 2-207(b). Proposed
section 1-102 declares: "This article applies to a transaction to the
extent that it is governed by any other article of the [U.C.C.] ' 35 If a
record is taken to be "a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of
the agreement" per section 2-202(1)(b), are evidences of 1-303 courses
and usages therefore irrelevant? Section 1-102 would suggest that the
answer must be "no." Section 2-202(1)(b), moreover, addresses only
32. U.C.C. § 1-303 (d), (e) (2001 Annual Meeting Draft). Subsection (f) declares that "a
course of performance is relevant to show a waiver or modification of any term inconsistent with
course of performance," qualifying subsection (e). Id. § 1-303(f).
33. Use of master agreements and electronic alternatives to written forms may, in any event,
reduce the number of form battles-and therefore increase the salience of other settings for
purposes of section 2-207 jurisprudence. See generally Keating, supra note 6; McCarthy, supra
note 13, at 1024-27.
34. Terms that pass the section 2-202 tests, of course, may not meet other U.C.C.
requirements.
35. U.C.C. § 1-102 (2001 Annual Meeting Draft).
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"consistent additional terms" in party records-perhaps itself suggesting
that parties cannot by agreement legally displace otherwise relevant
courses or usages, except by providing express alternatives sufficient to
cause inconsistencies within the meaning of section 1-303(e).36
How proposed sections 1-303, 2-202 and 2-207 are supposed to fit
together is a question of some importance in at least one kind of dispute
we can repeatedly glimpse in 2-202 opinions in recent years. Businesses
functioning as purchasers of widely-marketed, branded or otherwise spe-
cialized products-prototypically retailers of, for example, franchise
food or petroleum products-frequently enter into arrangements with a
supplier on terms specified in an elaborate, standard, mostly non-negoti-
able document put forward by the supplier. This document will often
grant discretion to the supplier with respect to matters of obvious impor-
tance to the retailer-for example, product price, specifications, or the
proximity of competing product retailers. The document will also often
proclaim itself to be "a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of
the agreement." It is easy to understand why suppliers faced with large
numbers of purchasers would proceed in this fashion. It is just as easy
to understand why purchasers should worry.
This is a situation very different from Richard Hyland's idyll-the
prospect of self-interested assertion likely will not prompt indifferent
acquiescence. And indeed, some purchasers do seek assurances from
agents of a supplier that discretion will not be exercised in ways signifi-
cantly inconsistent with retailer interests. The agents may respond
orally, referring sometimes to established supplier policies or procedures
that should work to protect purchasers. Or so purchasers claim.37 In
other cases, purchasers might write to the agents (or the agents might
write) regarding the expectations of the purchasers.38 In any case, the
standard document will not be changed. Purchasers whose worst fears
materialize, who confront sudden price hikes, unfit goods, or nearby
competitors, and who sue to enforce their sense of the arrangements,
often find that courts read section 2-202 as a bar. There is, it appears,
only one relevant record. Not only inconsistent oral communications
and unilateral writings, but also supplier policies codified in other docu-
36. If such practices and exclusivity terms were to be regarded as not agreeing for purposes of
section 2-207, even if coexisting for purposes of section 2-202, parties would be left with only
U.C.C. gap-fillers pursuant to section 2-207(c).
37. See, e.g., Davis v. McDonald's Corp., 44 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1254 (N.D. Fla. 1998)
(oblique oral reference to policies); Precision Printing Co. v. Unisource Worldwide, 993 F. Supp.
338, 344 (W.D. Pa. 1998); Wayman v. Amoco Oil Co., 923 F. Supp. 1322, 1336 (D. Kan. 1996);
Lykes Pasco, Inc. v. Ahava Dairy Prods. Corp., CV-97-0652, 1997 WL 855504 (E.D.N.Y. Nov.
13, 1997).
38. E.g., Steiner v. Mobil Oil, 569 P.2d 751 (Cal. 1977).
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ments which might in any event be understood to structure supplier dis-
cretion, are legally invisible because the master agreement-signed by
the supplier-proclaims its own exclusivity.39
Cases like these put considerable pressure on the proposed section
2-202(1)(b) phrase "intended... as a complete and exclusive statement
of the terms of the agreement."40 If suppliers in any case expect to be-
more precisely, organize themselves so that their agents ordinarily will
be-governed by criteria articulated in other documents, in what sense
can it be said that suppliers intend to act at their discretion, as the would-
be master contracts proclaim? A supplier can only assert a party-spe-
cific claim to discretion, a freedom to act inconsistently vis-a-vis any
particular purchaser. Plainly enough, purchasers cannot be presumed,
without closer investigation, to intend to subject themselves to substan-
tial risks inherent in unqualified supplier discretion. The judges, how-
ever, may have a point. There is at least sometimes an obvious agency
problem in these cases-Professors White and Summers refer to it as the
problem of "the seller's effusive salesperson."4 Why not afford suppli-
ers the opportunity to restrict legal rights of purchasers, and thereby
restrict the apparent authority of their own agents-at least if the master
document terms are not unconscionable?
Section 2-202 does not itself suggest how-through consideration
of what factors-a court can decide that it "finds the record to have been
intended as a complete and exclusive statement . . . ." In many cases,
judges appear to be persuaded by a document's own proclamation, and
the signatures of the parties. But this smacks of question-begging. The
hardest cases have to do with the implications of a seller's own policy
documents-sources of either ordinary limits that the seller exceeded in
the particular instance, or moral hazards sharpening the sense that unilat-
39. See, e.g., W. Intermodal Servs., Ltd. v. Singemas Container Indus., Co., 41 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv.2d (CBC) 1168, No. 98 Civ. 8275, 2000 WL 343780 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2000); Davis, 44 F.
Supp. 2d at 1256-58 (elaborate policy documents do not limit discretion conferred in self-labeled
integrated contract); Precision Printing, 993 F. Supp. at 354-55; Wayman, 923 F. Supp. at 1331-
41 (extensive account of policy documents followed by recognition of supplier discretion). See
also Betaco, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 103 F.3d 1281, 1286-92 (7Th Cir. 1996) (oral
representations and marketing documents irrelevant regarding terms of airplane sale). Some
courts, to be sure, do look closely at context before judging the significance of records additional
to the record claiming exclusivity. See, e.g., Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 61 F. Supp.
2d 1300 (S.D. Fla. 1999); Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 61 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (S.D. Fla.
1999); Confer Plastics v. Hunkar Labs., 964 F. Supp. 73, 79 (W.D.N.Y. 1997). Outside the
U.C.C. setting, this latter approach is sometimes depicted as dominant. See, e.g., ROBERT A.
HILLMAN, THE RIcHNEss OF CONTRACT LAW 169 (1997). Other commentators present courts as
chronically divided in their analyses of integration clauses. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, The Parol
Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U.
PA. L. REV. 533, 534-40 (1998).
40. U.C.C. § 2-202(l)(b) (2001 Annual Meeting Draft).
41. WnTrE & SUMMERS, supra note 6, at 105.
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eral discretion ought not to be understood as agreed. Supplier policies
are not readily labeled as "courses" or "usage" for purposes of proposed
section 1-303. The U.C.C. definitions are innocently pre-Weberian.
They focus on dealings "between the parties" or conduct "in a place,
vocation, or trade," and appear to ignore the bureaucratic positionings,
the specifications of routine, through which the parties organize them-
selves.4" But even if the definitions were to be read broadly, the section
1-303(e) consistency requirement would remain a hurdle. Perhaps sub-
section 1-303(d)'s assertion of the relevance of courses and usages, and
its recognition that such practices "may ...qualify the terms of the
agreement," could provide a basis for incorporating seller policies as
limits on seemingly conferred discretion. The use of "may" in section 1-
303, plainly, does not itself motivate this aggressive approach.
Courses and usages, however, are not the only explanatory
resources identified in proposed Article 1.
Every contract.., imposes an obligation of good faith in its perform-
ance and enforcement.43
'Good faith' . .. means honesty in fact and the observance of reason-
able commercial standards of fair dealing.44
The obligation[] of good faith ... may not be disclaimed by agree-
ment. The parties, by agreement, may determine the standards by
which ... performance ... is to be measured if those standards are
not manifestly unreasonable.45
The complex interaction of these provisions is reminiscent of the interior
arrangements of sections 2-202 and 2-207. The "obligation of good
faith" is a matter of "contract" but not "agreement." It is in this sense
statutory. "Good faith" is not, however, itself a contract "term." The
obligation of good faith "does not support an independent cause of
action."46 Its enforcement can occur, therefore, only within the context
of a dispute concerning some other contract "term," originating in either
agreement or statute (the U.C.C., we have seen, defines "contract" more
broadly than "agreement"). 47 The agreement of the parties "may deter-
mine the standards" giving content to the obligation. But these stan-
dards cannot be "manifestly unreasonable," and are therefore statutorily
delimited. The legislative definition of reasonableness, however, is
"commercial standards of fair dealing." Section 1-303 courses and
42. See U.C.C. §§ 1-303(a), (b) & (c) (2001 Annual Meeting Draft).
43. Id. § 1-304.
44. Id. § 1-201(19).
45. Id. § 1-302(b).
46. Id. § 1-304 preliminary cmt. 1.
47. Sometimes a statutory term itself acknowledges the pertinence of good faith. See, e.g.,




usages are relevant in this regard, to be sure. But they cannot be consid-
ered as exhausting the statutory obligation if "good faith" is not a statu-
tory redundancy.48
We have, it becomes apparent, a series of statutory responses to the
problem-what the U.C.C. notably treats as a problem-implicit in the
specification of contract terms. Section 2-202 identifies and freezes
terms to be treated as matters of party agreement; section 1-303 simi-
larly isolates party courses of conduct and trade usages statutorily
deemed to be parts of an agreement (a neatly ambiguous exercise in
blurring the line between party choice and legal imposition). Section 2-
207 addresses remaining gaps, perhaps picking up agreed-upon terms
outside sections 2-202 and 1-303, perhaps more often matching gaps
with Article 2 provisions able themselves to supply missing terms. The
U.C.C. good faith obligation is, it appears, more microscopic: it fills
gaps within terms, in particular replacing opportunities to act unilater-
ally-at discretion-with responsibility to observe "commercial stan-
dards of fair dealing." This requirement, in turn, initiates its own
interplay, requiring formulation of a perspective drawing upon, but still
independent of, party practices.
In the supplier discretion cases, from the perspective of good faith
analysis so conceived, it would not be easy to explain why supplier poli-
cies were irrelevant. As descriptions of the way a supplier ordinarily
proceeded, these policies would be one plausible source of
benchmarks-"commercial standards" as it were-for determining
whether the supplier's conduct in the particular instance was either arbi-
trary or alternatively a plausible response to changed circumstances.
Alleged oral representations of supplier agents would ordinarily seem to
be less pertinent, however, unless the particular agents possessed policy-
making authority or communicated often enough with policymakers. It
would not be sufficient, from this perspective, for a supplier to argue
that a would-be exclusive record was entirely clear in its declaration of
discretion. There would need to be some basis as well for concluding
that narrowly case-by-case determination, akin to the approach to adju-
dication propounded by Richard Hyland, was reasonable because no
broader "commercial standards of fair dealing" were plausibly conceiva-
ble. Good faith, thus, appears to provide resources for directly address-
ing the issues at hand.
E.
This accumulation of statutory mechanisms cannot be explained-
48. U.C.C. § 1-304 preliminary cmt. 1 (2001 Annual Meeting Draft) (obligation of good faith
is "further implemented" by § 1-303).
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the deployment of any of the alternatives defended-through straightfor-
ward invocation of the virtues of freedom of contract or the in-dwelling
wisdom of commercial practices. Party agreement and commercial
practices count, to be sure, but (with apologies to Gertrude Stein) there
is simply too much too statutory there there.
More precisely: Proposed section 2-202 is preoccupied with
records and terms, with attributes or intentions bound up with form-the
exclusivity or non-exclusivity of particular records, for example. Inten-
tions or expectations of parties concerning the substance of their
arrangements as such are less pertinent (this distinction is never air-tight,
of course). The formal investigations that implementation of section 2-
202 supposes extend beyond the question of exclusivity. A nonexclu-
sive record may (or may not) claim status as a "final expression" of the
terms it incorporates. Given a recorded "final expression," additional
terms, originating in other records, must not be contradictory, but con-
sistent and supplementary. Additional or overlaying terms originating in
party course of conduct or trade usages must pass similar scrutiny under
section 1-303. Cases and commentary suggest that considerations like
these start from the idea that an acceptable additional term must appear
to fill a gap left by other terms, to address a subject not covered by other
terms. 49 A contract, thus, is implicitly modeled on the notion of a list,
an accumulation or aggregation of terms conceived as independent
items, and not as an inter-related whole.5"
The idea of the list does not require that any given list be complete.
Seemingly paradoxically, the possibility that terms do not specify a
complete list, that there may be missing items, is just as pertinent with
respect to records parties "intend[ ] . . . as a complete and exclusive
statement of ... terms." Section 2-202 refers here to intent with respect
to relevant records ("this is the only relevant record"); it does not sup-
pose that, somehow, the intent of the parties proves that all necessary
terms can indeed be found in the relevant record if the reader looks
carefully enough.5' Section 2-207, of course, begins with missing items.
49. See C-Thru Container Corp. v. Midland Mfg. Co., 533 N.w.2d 542, 545 (Iowa 1995);
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 6, at 94-101; 1 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE SERIES § 2-202:3, pp. 2-189 to 2-197 (1999). One starting point for this approach is the
U.C.C. definition of "term," included unchanged in proposed U.C.C. § 1-201(43): "'Term' means
a portion of an agreement that relates to a particular matter." U.C.C. § 1-201(43) (2001 Annual
Meeting Draft) (emphasis added).
50. See generally JACK GOODY, What's in a List? in THE DOMESTICATION OF THE SAVAGE
MIND 74-11 (1977). It is the combination of the acknowledged possibility of incompleteness and
the assumption that terms possess their own separate fields of reference that suggest the image of
the list. Incompleteness alone is not inconsistent with inter-relatedness. See, e.g., SUSAN HAACK,
EVIDENCE AND INQUIRY 81-89 (1993) (crossword puzzle as epistemological model).
51. See also Laing Logging Inc. v. Int'l Paper Co., 644 N.Y.S.2d 91, 93-94 (N.Y. App. Div.
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It supplies added terms-in particular, cross-references U.C.C. gapfil-
lers-but not to fill out, in full, a contract list. The only provisions that
2-207 supplies are those needed to resolve the immediate dispute. The
good faith obligation is, in principle, different. It invokes a generally
applicable norm. But because Article 1 ties good faith to disputes about
particular terms, its universality becomes beside the point: good faith,
too, functions as a gapfiller informing (informing only) terms in
question.
This statutory preference for parts instead of wholes, the accompa-
nying agnosticism as between incomplete and complete lists, is as much
hard-headed drafting as it is mereology. If we expect contract terms to
come from several sources, we would not want to approach the process
of interpretation by assuming that contracts are unitary. Too much
emphasis on common themes or inter-relationships or overlaps would
not be true to the enterprise of contract formation. We would not be
surprised to encounter, too often, frustrating incongruities, dissonance,
antinomies. Proposed sections 2-202, 1-303, and 2-207, as well as
U.C.C. subordination of the good faith norm, because they all proceed
on an opposite formal assumption, work to marginalize this risk.
Proposed section 2-207 plainly treats contracts as typically com-
posites. It proclaims three sources for contract terms-manifest agree-
ment of the parties, implicit agreement of the parties, and other
provisions of the U.C.C. itself. It treats all three sources as equally
available-proposes "formal democracy."52  Terms that result from
party agreements are listed first. This is plainly not, however, a state-
ment of legislative preferment.5 3 There is, in fact, no simple rank order.
The salience of other U.C.C. provisions, of course, does depend upon
which terms in particular turned out to be subjects of party agreement. 4
But insofar as section 2-202 censors additional party terms generating
overlaps, and therefore leaves unresolved the issues addressed only by
the overlapping additional terms, the space for statutory supplements
1996) (§ 2-202 allows reference to § 2-306 to insert good faith obligation in requirements
contract).
52. It may be notable that the new version changes the title of the section. Instead of dealing
with the seemingly only occasional, party-triggered problem of "Additional Terms in Acceptance
or Confirmation," proposed section 2-207 is both entirely general and purports to be definitive:
"Terms of Contract; Effect of Confirmation." The Preliminary Comment is quite clear about this:
"This section has been thoroughly revised. It states the terms of all contracts for sale, not just
those as to which there has been a 'battle of the forms."' U.C.C. § 2-207 preliminary cmt. 1
(2001 Annual Meeting Draft)
53. Statutory mandatory terms are effectively first terms.
54. Some U.C.C. provisions are mixed cases: recognize the possibility that party terms might
supersede, but closely define the circumstances in which this can occur. See, e.g., proposed
U.C.C. § 2-309(3) (2001 Annual Meeting Draft) (notice of termination); id. § 2-312(3) (regulating
disclaimer of warranty of title).
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increases. Proposed section 2-202 does not subject added statutory
terms to its screens. Section 1-303 imposes agreement on parties given
extant courses of dealing or performance or trade usages, and subsection
1-303(e) plainly arranges these resources in a hierarchy. The consis-
tency requirement again breaks priority: overlapping party terms oust
courses and usages. The good faith norm takes charge over party terms
seemingly granting freedom to pursue unilateral advantage. But the
content of the norm acknowledges the relevance of commercial under-
standings, and thus the pertinence of party practices, even as it signals
without defining a (therefore unresolved, unstable) statutory recasting.
The proposed U.C.C. sections thus appear to assume, setting aside
statutory-mandated terms, that party terms, courses and usages, and par-
ticular U.C.C. terms simply co-exist, disclose no clear-cut priorities.
Such stratification is, perhaps, a not-surprising phenomenon in intensely
wrought legal language." It is also, perhaps, substantively a sign of an
underlying legislative agnosticism. Arguments may be made for the
advantages of any one resource; each may be understood as a supersed-
ing critique of the others.56 This skepticism is not easily fit within per-
spectives that treat bodies of contract law as concerned chiefly with the
understandings of the immediate parties to contracts.57 Legislation
(either statutory or judge-made) correspondingly figures as peripheral,
addressing "failures" of various kinds. But the idea of "party under-
standings," it might be argued, perhaps especially in the commercial set-
ting, is not always easy to elaborate. Because of information costs or
other transactional difficulties, parties might not negotiate terms as such;
each might in any case attach priority to different parts of an agreement,
and thus act more on a sense of parts than wholes; parties might reasona-
bly behave strategically in all sorts of ways. 58  Difficulties like these
55. Cf M.M. BAKHTIN, Discourse in the Novel, in THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION: FOUR
ESSAYS 288-91 (1934-35) (Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist trans. 1981).
56. It is evident from this formulation that there is no necessary "private sphere"
acknowledged within this perspective, no ordinary domain of freedom of contract or private
ordering that is presumptively acknowledged or taken for granted-only case-specific and
therefore provisional arrangements. Cf Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle
of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller's "Consideration and Form," 100 CoL. L. REV. 94, 125-26,
168-71 (2000) (criticizing Fuller's "internal" analysis of "private autonomy").
57. For an especially clear presentation of this assumption, in the course of a careful
discussion of the parol evidence rule, see Posner, supra note 39, at 541-42.
58. These possibilities are widely-recognized. Indeed, they are sometimes taken as almost the
entirety of the subject of economic analyses of contracts. E.g., BERNARD SALANIE, THE
ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTS: A PRIMER (1997). Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner situate their well-
known essay precisely within the universe of incomplete and strategy-beset agreements. See Ian
Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 92-94 (1989). Indeed, they propose their notion of "penalty defaults"-
contract law supplying terms in cases of gaps in agreements-precisely as a response to the
problem: if legal default rules are properly ill-tailored, parties will address matters, and reach
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could perhaps be pushed to the margin, depicted as unusual or extreme
cases (the stuff of legislation), if it were plausible to posit the existence
of accumulations of customary practice-both rich and generally accept-
able-figuring in the backdrop, in enough lines of business, informing
and overshadowing individual negotiations or agreements. Article 2 as
it now stands, many believe, proceeds on such a hypothesis. But this
supposition is also controversial. Trade custom might be a kind of effi-
cient collective unconscious; but it is also readily represented as subject
to strategic maneuver and prone to incompleteness-as more or less
arbitrary, sometimes sporadic private government.59
F.
It does seem odd, all the same, to ground consensus legislation like
the Uniform Commercial Code in a general commitment to doubt.
Awkwardness abates, I think, if we reverse gestalt and treat party
choices or trade practices as delegations within the U.C.C. statutory
scheme. The norms that organize and justify statutes, ultimately expres-
sions of constitutional assumptions, become starting points for analysis,
supplanting and at least partly supplying content for notions like party
understandings and trade customs. Within statutory and constitutional
perspectives, I think, the possibility of disagreement, doubt, and dissent
appears precisely as an important part of the subject at hand-and as
therefore addressable. 60  As a general matter, the U.C.C. recognizes
party-specified terms or business usages to be substitutes for statutory
formulations.61 Proposed section 2-207 is the most obvious Article 2
implementation. From the legislative perspective, in which statutory
terms and party terms appear as alternatives, party terms are treated as
better choices (statutory terms themselves apply only if there are no per-
tinent party terms or usages). From the perspective of parties them-
selves, correspondingly, their agreements appear as opt-outs,
repudiations of inferior, otherwise already in-place statutory terms.
agreements they otherwise would not have reached, in order to preclude enforcement of the
default rules. Party agreements that the law can enforce presuppose legal provocation.
59. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2's Incorporation
Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 710 (1999). See also Alan Schwartz & Robert
E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 595 (1995). For an
especially striking overview, see David Charny, The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. CHI. L.
REv. 842 (1999).
60. 1 do not mean to suppose that consensus obtains as to the assumptions behind statutory
and constitutional jurisprudence-only, rather, that conflict is itself a recognized part of the
subject-matter.
61. "Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) or elsewhere in the Uniform Commercial
Code, the effect of provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code may be varied by agreement."
U.C.C. § 1-302(a) (2001 Annual Meeting Draft).
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There is nothing especially remarkable about this. It is not at all uncom-
mon for statutes to acknowledge that matters may sometimes be better
handled by adaptations by individuals or institutions subject to the stat-
utes. Louis Jaffe's New Deal formulation remains classic: "The
machine must be harnessed and run by those who can best run it ...
[T]he legislature may legitimately consider that public administration in
some cases is inadequate acting alone and is otherwise a positive and
unnecessary embarrassment."62 "Lawmaking by private groups" is a
familiar phenomenon.63
Constitutional law conditions statutory delegations. Legislation
must propound an "intelligible principle, '64 some basis for supposing
that particular private choices, akin in this respect to the choices of gov-
ernment administrators, are likely to serve public purposes-and, to
assure this end, are also susceptible to independent assessment and
enforcement. 65 A provision such as proposed section 2-207 does not
announce straightforwardly substantive legislative criteria confining pri-
vate discretion. The assurance that private choices match up with public
purposes served must be oblique, derive instead from characteristics of
the context of private choice. The process of private choice must be a
version of public politics. Proposed section 2-207-or rather, the
ensemble of U.C.C. provisions that section 2-207 ties together-may be
read from this perspective as both resting upon and working to realize
three assumptions:
First, insofar as a choice to displace statutory terms in favor of
party terms supposes the agreement of parties acting on the
basis of partly congruent and partly conflicting interests,
choice (it must seem) does not reduce, too often anyway, to
unmediated preference for the agenda of one or the other
party.
Second, insofar as choice addresses matters that are also iden-
tifiably statutory subjects, party agreement (it must seem) is
plausibly described as disagreement with statutory disposi-
tions-the considered dissent that the U.C.C. means to
accommodate.66
62. Louis Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REv. 201, 253 (1937).
63. For a careful effort to sort out different versions, see DONALD R. BRAND, CORPORATISM
AND THE RULE OF LAW (1988).
64. See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 903, 912 (2001).
65. For discussion of the general framework, see Lisa Schultz Bressmann, Schecter Poultry at
the Millenium: A Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399 (2000).
For an especially intensely-argued application, see A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in
Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DuKE L.J. 17
(2000).
66. Proposed section 2-207 therefore rejects the option that some see to be afforded by
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Third, insofar as party agreement is also framed as specific
and segmented, agreement is expressed (it must seem) in a
form amenable not only to enforcement, but to restatement and
scrutiny.
In this light, proposed section 2-202 plays an initially crucial role.
It distinguishes those party agreements (if any) that are definitely con-
cluded, in some or all respects, from interchanges that are less clear-cut,
attributing authority only to the former. As a result, it can be argued,
section 2-202 works to restrict party replacement of statutory terms to
those matters to which parties are most likely to have brought to bear
their combination of overlapping and competing interests, and thus
reached governing conclusions rather than simply restating their perhaps
strategically exaggerated wants. In any event, section 2-202, because of
what it brings about, itself engineers this transformation. A record sin-
gled out by section 2-202 becomes an "inscribed" commitment, an
instrumentum pacis. Because section 2-202 marks it as legally enforcea-
ble, the record is not only a list of party choices, but itself (because it
exists) a reason to adhere to choices once made. Choices become self-
supporting, limit subsequent strategic options, reduce the ex post attrac-
tiveness of unilateral advantage-taking, and thus generate reliable assur-
ance, trust in forbearance, even (perhaps precisely) for strategically-
minded parties.67  Party agreements become exercises in self-
government.68
This account is most persuasive in association with section 2-202's
treatment of records deemed "final expressions" or "complete and exclu-
sive statements." These records, it can be concluded, already single
themselves out. The parties, it may be thought, are acting against the
backdrop of the same document that the U.C.C. marks. Matching terms
present section 2-207: exchange of inconsistent forms blocking application of substantive
statutory provisions, leaving actual terms to be negoatiated after dispute emerges, under threat of
costly and uncertain litigation. See Mark E. Roszkowski & John D. Wladis, Revised U.C.C.
Section 2-207: Analysis and Recommendations, 49 Bus. LAW. 1065, 1068-69 (1994) (reporting
practitioner view).
67. See U.C.C. § 1-201(34) (2001 Annual Meeting Draft) (defining "record"); JOHN Bossy,
PEACE IN THE POST-REFORMATION 4 (1998) (instrumentum pacis); T. M. SCANLON, WHAT WE
OWE TO EACH OTHER 302-09 (1998) (promising as assurance); PAUL WEIRICH, EQUILIBRIUM AND
RATIONALITY: GAME THEORY REVISED BY DECISION RULES 51-54 (1998) (self-support). It is not,
therefore, that the parties agree in some strong substantive sense, but merely agree to regulate (and
therefore create reason to reduce) subsequent disagreements that circumstances might motivate.
U.C.C. statutory terms, obviously, induce precisely the same responses in the absence of a section
2-202 record.
68. For further discussion of the idea of self-government, and its jurisprudential and
constitutional overtones, see Patrick 0. Gudridge, Public Privacy (Self-Government), 53 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 395 (1999). I owe to Mary Coombs the suggestion that a developed notion of self-
government should need to address contract law.
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in multiple confirmatory records are also protected by section 2-202,
however, and are recognized as decisive in proposed section 2-207(a).
Should the mere fact that record terms agree, a fact that parties may not
realize until a dispute is at hand, be treated as somehow proof of "self-
government" in the sense just laid out? The U.C.C., we are assuming,
not only judges but also structures party choices (in order to satisfy the
constitutional constraint on legislative delegations). Proposed sections
2-202 and 2-207 put parties on notice to take seriously all terms in their
own confirmatory records. The end result may be more actual negotia-
tion-self-government. Or parties may reduce the number of proffered
terms, increasing the field for Article 2 terms or pertinent courses or
usages. If parties instead opt for unilateral but relatively general formu-
las, and records turn out to match, the U.C.C. good faith obligation
might well determine the outcome in the event of subsequent dispute.
The delegation would again become moot. If unilaterally-proposed
terms which are relatively specific are offered, given these alternative
possibilities, and in fact match, the conclusion that these terms catch the
equities of the arrangement is certainly plausible. Agreement is not
likely just coincidence.69
A reading of section 2-202 along these lines highlights the troub-
ling element in the cases in which a first party's representative offers
supplemental oral or written changes, responding to the second party's
insistences, without literally altering the first party's seemingly defini-
tive draft of contract terms. The clearer the departure that the supple-
mental materials make from ostensibly official terms, the greater the
difficulty in treating the process as an attempted resolution of competing
interests-rather than just a Mutt and Jeff ploy. The public dimension
that "finalization" proclaims-the signal and assurance of self-govern-
ment-seems more than ordinarily likely to be a false face. This does
not mean that the supplemental communications replace their counter-
parts in the supposedly integrated agreement. There is no unequivocal
commitment. As a result, new section 2-207 becomes relevant. Because
they disagree, neither the pertinent parts of the would-be final document
nor the addendum become legally enforceable terms under either sub-
sections 2-207(a) or (b).7" Subsection (c) would then install U.C.C.
terms.7'
69. I am not suggesting some magical meeting of the minds. Agreement to be governed by
terms is not necessarily agreement to the elaborated content of terms.
70. Other provisions of the putative final agreement, because not contradicted, fit readily
within subsection 2-207(a).
71. Given the apparent popularity of "master agreements," see Keating, supra note 6, at 2696-
97, but also the likelihood that party representatives may from time to time generate additional
documents in order to close a deal, see Steiner v. Mobil Oil, 569 P.2d 751 (Cal. 1977), the
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Proposed section 1-303 reveals political dimensions akin to those
evident in proposed section 2-202. The definition of "course of per-
formance" emphasizes not only "repeated occasions for performance,"
but "knowledge of the nature of the performance" and "opportunity for
objection" 72 -clear circumstantial indicators of thought-out interaction.
"Course of dealing" similarly tests choice: the decisive question is not
only whether "previous transactions" establish "a common basis of
understanding" but whether "previous transactions" constitute "a
sequence of conduct" and thus, it might be argued, a series of opportuni-
ties for choice.73 The framework of choice here is less sharply
presented-past is not present, and accumulation of transactions is not
necessarily suggestive of assent. It is hardly surprising, within the terms
of this account, that subsection 1-303(e)(2) gives priority to course of
performance over course of dealing.74 "Usage of trade" is the section 1-
303 counterpart of matching terms. The statutory definition insists that a
"practice or method of dealing" possess sufficient "regularity of obser-
vance" so as "to justify an expectation that it will be observed with
respect to the transaction in question."75 This is a test of notice. Sub-
section 1-303(e)(1) itself supplies the opt-out chance: inconsistent
"express terms prevail .... ."I' (This subsection enables exit from-and
therefore underscores assent to-courses of performance and dealing as
well.)
It is important to note that the good faith obligation extends to all
U.C.C. "contract" terms,77 not just those that are matters of "agreement"
identified by proposed sections 2-202 and 2-207(a) and (b), but pro-
posed section 1-303 courses and usages, and U.C.C. provisions incorpo-
rated by proposed section 2-207(c).78 Spaces for discretion are filled
whatever the source. Individual choices are not dictated; good faith con-
cerns, however, test choices-demand defensible explanations. From
the constitutional perspective, therefore, the U.C.C. provisions that I
have been discussing describe an intricate arrangement of off-sets. Party
agreements are put in position to dissent-to reject and replace statutory
interaction of sections 2-202 and 2-207 in this setting may be of some practical significance. See
also Avery W. Katz, On the Use of Practitioner Surveys in Commercial Law Research, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 2760, 2769-72 (2000) (forms and agency).
72. U.C.C. § 1-303(a) (2001 Annual Meeting Draft).
73. See id. § 1-303(b).
74. See id. § 1-303(e)(2).
75. Id. § 1-303(c).
76. Id. § 1-303(e)(1).
77. See id. § 1-304.
78. See id. § 1-201(11). Because the good faith obligation is a matter of "contract," it inde-
pendently addresses statutory terms included in a contract whether or not the statutory provisions
themselves make express mention of good faith.
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terms or trade usages. But there is no zone of party autonomy per se:
freedom of contract is freedom to legislate, protected only as affirma-
tively exercised. Incomplete exercises in self-government return legisla-
tive jurisdiction to statute and usage-as either sources of terms or,
within the working out of terms, the tests of good faith scrutiny. This is
a familiar, near-Madisonian constitutional order. Skepticism-entirely
general-both prompts and organizes legal pluralism.
G.
The particular questions posed at the start of these investigations
now have answers:
First, proposed section 2-207(b) is not an open-ended grant of
authority to judges on my model of Richard Hyland's proposal. This
subsection is plausibly the site for incorporation into section 2-207 of
proposed section 1-303's processing of courses and usages given the
emphasis on assent we have discerned in the latter provision's framings.
Subsection 2-207(b) may also serve as a catch-all for party agreements
that somehow fall outside proposed section 2-202. Subsections (a) and
(c) will in practice likely mark the most common sources of contract
terms.79
Second, proposed section 2-207 is not, despite its admirably suc-
cinct wording, itself decisive of very much. Before section 2-207
becomes pertinent, proposed sections 1-103 and 2-202 specify impor-
tant, potentially complex investigations. After 2-207 does its work, the
U.C.C. good faith obligation remains relevant for purposes of judging
uses parties make of U.C.C. contract terms. Richard Hyland is nonethe-
less right, I think, in hypothesizing some sort of ambitious judicial
responsibility. It is not, to be sure, oracular divination of party under-
standings, whether unmediated or (as in present section 2-207) through
contemplation of fragments. It is not, mostly, 2-207 application at all-
this provision, however revealing as a kind of jurisprudential tableau
vivant, has become simply a list of possibilities. Rather, in the effort to
bring to bear proposed sections 1-303 and 2-202, and especially the
U.C.C. good faith obligation, judges enforce formal democracy, take
seriously the possibility of alternative sources of contract terms, and
therefore the opportunity for critique and acknowledgement.
Third, it is not just this. The idea of self-government as the model
of party agreement in particular possesses real substantive bite. It sets
outside the politics of the provisions that I have been discussing the
79. For discussion predating proposed section 2-207, but arguing in essence for this result, see
Roszkowski & Wladis, supra note 66, at 1073-75.
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pattern of assertion and acquiescence, of individual opportunity-seeking,
that Richard Hyland's asides dramatize. 80 Self-government instead, sup-
poses common projects-in this sense, public ends. It imparts to the
idea of good faith, in particular (the other proposed provisions also), a
peculiarly constitutional function and content. Hyland's assumption (or
rather, the assumption that I impose upon him) that contracts begin with
the individual is incomplete. Rather, new section 2-207 and company
suggest that contracts originate in law, and in the question of the sources
of law, and thus the question of politics. It is only within this matrix that
individual parties appear. The role of the judge is to identify and protect
the integrity of the alternating politics.
Not Karl Llewellyn, John Ely?
81
80. Opportunistic consensus does not disappear, of course. It can manifest itself, however,
only in circumstances of no dispute whatsoever (Hyland's instances). It is not a point of departure
for dispute resolution.
81. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). John Ely is the
Richard A. Hausler Professor of Law at the University of Miami.
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